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FERC Anti-Manipulation Enforcement
and the Barclays Proceeding: What
Factors Should Regulated Entities
Consider before Deciding to Follow
Barclays' Path to Federal Court?
Matthew Hale*
Abstract
Energy regulation is not a new topic, but after the Enron
scandal, Congress made significant changes. The changes were
embodied in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. One major change
was to FERC's ability to hand down penalties for market
manipulation. Recently, FERC has been aggressively enforcing
its power and anticipates anti-manipulation enforcement will be
a point of emphasis in the future. The first entity to
challenge FERC's power in federal court is Barclays. The
Barclays case, other recent enforcement actions, and the
regulations FERC has promulgated provide a guide to regulated
entities about how and when they should challenge FERC in
federal court. The outcome of the Barclays case will have an
immense impact on future FERC enforcement actions.
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I. Introduction
In 2001, the Enron scandal ripped through California and
the nation’s economy.1 In the wake of the scandal, questions arose
about whether agencies like the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) had enough power to keep another Enron
type manipulation from occurring.2 One area of regulatory law
that has changed since the Enron scandal is FERC’s authority to
police and penalize market manipulation.3
Congress responded to the market manipulation problem
with provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct”).4 The
EPAct included major additions to FERC’s enforcement power.5 It
granted FERC authority to both regulate market manipulation
and impose civil penalties on regulated entities it finds
participated in market manipulation. 6 Since the beginning of
2013, FERC has aggressively enforced its new power and
1.
See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of
Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1277–78 (2002) (discussing the
financial implications of Enron’s collapse).
2.
See id. at 1288 (“Enron shows that the incentive structure that
motivates actors in our self-regulatory governance system generates much less
powerful checks against abuse than many observers have believed.”).
3.
See Allan Horwich, Warnings to the Unwary: MultiJurisdictional Federal Enforcement of Manipulation and Deception in the
Energy Markets after the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 27 ENERGY L.J. 363, 369
(2006) (discussing the added authority passed in the EPAct of 2005 as a
response to concerns that arose after the Enron scandal).
4.
See id. (noting the specific law that the U.S. government used
to respond to the concerns associated with the Enron scandal).
5.
See id. (“[T]he Energy Policy Act of 2005 . . . granted additional
enforcement power to the FERC and added to the array of and increased the
existing civil and criminal penalties for manipulative and deceptive conduct.”).
6.
See 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2014) (prohibiting market manipulation).
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regulated entities have consented to pay considerable fines. 7
Although Congress created FERC’s power in 2005, Barclays is the
first to challenge FERC’s anti-manipulation authority in a federal
court.8
On July 16, 2013, FERC issued an order assessing a $435
million fine against Barclays as previously proposed by FERC’s
Office of Enforcement on October 31, 2013.9 In addition, four
traders associated with the market manipulation were
individually fined. 10 Barclays refused to pay the fine,11 and FERC
recently filed an action in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California asking for an order affirming the
assessment.12
Section II of this Note discusses the history and passage of
the EPAct.13 Section III of this Note discusses FERC’s

7.
See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, 142
FERC ¶ 61,056, 1, Docket No. IN12-4, (Jan. 22, 2013) (assessing a civil penalty
for market manipulation against Deutsche Bank); Order Approving Stipulation
and Consent Agreement, 142 FERC ¶ 61,088, 1, Docket No. IN10-5, (Feb. 1,
2013) (assessing a civil penalty for market manipulation against Oceanside
Power); Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, 142 FERC ¶
61,218, 1, Docket No. IN12-11, (Mar. 22, 2013) (assessing a civil penalty for
market manipulation against Rumford Paper); Order Approving Stipulation and
Consent Agreement, 142 FERC ¶ 61,041, 1, Docket No. IN11-8 & IN13-5,
[hereinafter “JP Morgan Consent Agreement”] (July 30, 2013) (assessing a civil
penalty for market manipulation against JP Morgan).
8.
See Kelly Fetty, Barclays Rejects $453 Million Fine, Takes
FERC
to
Court,
DIGITAL
JOURNAL
(Aug.
7,
2013),
www.digitaljournal.com/article/356023 (discussing the precedential effect of the
Barclays decision) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
9.
See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, Docket No. IN08-8, 144
FERC ¶ 61,041, 75–76 (July 16, 2013) [hereinafter “Order Assessing Civil
Penalties”] (accepting Office of Enforcement staff’s recommendation for
penalties).
10.
See id. (agreeing with the penalties recommended by the Office
of Enforcement against the individual traders).
11.
See Petition for an Order Affirming FERC’s July 16, 2013
Order Assessing Penalties, at 2, FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. CV-02093,
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (stating that Barclays failed to pay the fine within 60
days).
12.
See id. (“The Commission now files this petition for an order
from this Court affirming the Order Assessing Civil Penalties.”).
13.
See infra Part II (discussing the history and passage of the
EPAct).
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promulgation of the anti-manipulation rule.14 Section IV of this
Note discusses FERC’s recent history of enforcement including its
considerable fine levied against JP Morgan.15 Section V addresses
the Barclays enforcement action.16 Section VI analyzes issues
that may be decided in the pending district court litigation. 17
Section VII of the note analyzes factors regulated entities should
consider when they determine whether to cooperate with FERC
or force FERC to litigate in federal court.18 Section VIII concludes
that when a regulated entity considers a large fine undeserved or
any amount of fine entirely unwarranted, a regulated entity
should take FERC to federal court, and when a large fine is
warranted or a small fine could be reduced to zero, a regulated
entity should settle with FERC.19

II. History of Energy Policy Act of 2005
Before the EPAct, FERC’s enforcement authority was
based on market behavior rules.20 The market behavior rules
were promulgated in 2003 to combat market-based trading
activity after the Commission discovered multiple price
manipulation schemes in California in 2000 and 2001.21 Rule 2 of
the market behavior rules included a prohibition for “[a]ctions or
14.
See infra Part III (outlining FERC’s promulgation of antimanipulation rule).
15.
See infra Part IV (explaining FERC’s recent history of
enforcement in situations similar to Barclay’s).
16.
See infra Part V (discussing Barclays pending enforcement
action).
17.
See infra Part VI (noting the issues that need to be resolved in
current district court litigation).
18.
See infra Part VII (elaborating on factors regulated entities
should consider when conducting business with FERC).
19.
See infra Part VII (discussing recommended actions for
regulated entities based on potential outcomes).
20.
See Joseph Kelliher, Market Manipulation, Market Power, and
the Authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 26 ENERGY L.J. 1,
31 (2005) (“Commission issued the Market Behavior Rules, establishing a
general prohibition of market manipulation and banning a number of specific
manipulative practices used by Enron.”).
21.
See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 113 FERC ¶
61,067, 61,243 (proposed Oct. 20, 2005) [hereinafter “NOPR”] (to be codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 1c.2) (discussing the history and purpose of the market behavioral
rules).
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transactions that are without a legitimate business purpose and
that are intended to or foreseeably could manipulate market
prices, market conditions, or market rules for electric energy or
electricity products.”22 However, by 2005, concerns began to grow
that FERC did not have the necessary tools to regulate its
markets.23
A major driver behind Congressional action and a model of
what FERC needed was Joseph Kelliher’s 2005 article. 24 At the
time, Kelliher was the Chairman of FERC.25 He outlined three
important changes needed for FERC to police and penalize
market manipulation.26 First, Kelliher proposed that FERC must
have an express authority to prohibit market manipulation that
did not involve Congress singling out specific instances of market
manipulation.27 Kelliher wanted FERC to have the ability to
promulgate
rules
that
generally
prohibited
market
manipulation.28 With that power, FERC could promulgate
regulations prohibiting behavior as quickly as market
participants came up with more creative ways to get around the
rules.29
Second, Kelliher advocated that FERC have civil and
criminal penalty authority when its market manipulation rule
was violated.30 He argued that both securities and commodities
law had established penalties for their market manipulation
22.
Investigation of Terms and Conditions of Public Utility
Market-Based Rate Authorizations, 105 FERC ¶ 61,218, 62,147 (Nov. 17, 2003).
23.
See Kelliher, supra note 20, at 1 (discussing market changes
over past 25 years impacting FERC’s ability to regulate effectively).
24 .
See id. at 33 (recommending Congressional action to enhance
FERC’s abilities to regulate).
25.
See id. at 1 n.* (stating that Kelliher was the Commissioner of
FERC).
26.
See id. at 30–31 (discussing three approaches to enhancing
FERC power to regulate).
27.
See id. at 31 (“It is unlikely that legislatively prohibiting
specific manipulative practices will prove an effective way to prevent market
manipulation.”).
28.
See id. (“A better approach would be to establish a general
prohibition of market manipulation and authorize the Commission to prohibit
specific manipulative practices.”).
29.
See id. (discussing that market participants normally find
creative means to circumvent an express Congressional prohibition).
30.
See id. at 30 (advocating that FERC needs the power to impose
civil penalties for violations of a manipulation rule).
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rules.31 With those examples in mind, Kelliher argued no public
policy rationale existed to support the difference in enforcement
powers between FERC and other market regulators.32
Third, Kelliher advocated for FERC to have the ability to
collect market information.33 He argued that FERC needed the
ability to collect information on market participants outside of an
investigation or report for Congress. 34 Kelliher argued that
without power to collect information, FERC would have more
difficulty adequately regulating markets.35
After Kelliher’s article, Congress addressed whether or not
to enhance FERC’s authority to regulate energy markets.
Congress included new power for FERC in EPAct. 36 However,
there is very little language in the Congressional Record to
indicate whether representatives and senators were satisfied
with the rule. In the House of Representatives, Samuel Farr of
California stated that the EPAct did not adequately address
market manipulation concerns. 37 However, Senator Bingaman of
New Mexico believed that consumers benefited from the Act and
that the bill contained measures that would make markets more
transparent.38 Senator Bingaman stated that the Act was meant

31.
See id. (“Securities and commodities laws include express
prohibitions of market manipulation.”).
32.
See id. (“There is no valid public policy reason why the
Commission should not have the same enforcement tools as other federal
economic regulatory agencies.”).
33.
See id. at 32 (“There is also a need to strengthen the
Commission’s ability to collect market information on a routine basis from all
market participants, not just public utilities.”).
34.
See id. (“Under current law, the Commission can obtain
information only from market participants other than public utilities in the
course of a specific enforcement investigation, or in the preparation of a report
to Congress.”).
35.
See id. (arguing that under the then existing scheme FERC
could not adequately maintain an understanding of developments in the
market).
36.
See 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2014) (granting FERC power to punish
market manipulation).
37.
See 151 CONG. REC. H2192-02, H2209, (daily ed. April 20,
2005) (“The bill does not give federal regulators the tools they need to prevent
and punish bad actors like Enron who manipulate power markets.”).
38.
See 151 CONG. REC. S9255-01, S9258, (daily ed. July 28, 2005)
(“The conference report has perhaps some of the strongest provisions in the area
of protection of energy consumers.”).
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to prohibit market manipulation.39 Senator Harkin of Iowa also
stated that the Act was meant to protect consumers but added
that the Act was directed at actions like those that occurred
during the Enron scandal.40
President George W. Bush signed EPAct into law on
August 8, 2005.41 The two statutory provisions of note for FERC
address market manipulation42 and civil penalties.43 The market
manipulation statute states that:
It shall be unlawful for any entity (including an
entity described in section 824(f) of this title),
directly or indirectly, to use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of electric
energy or the purchase or sale of transmission
services subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance (as those terms are used in section
78j(b) of Title 15), in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of electric ratepayers.44
The statute granting civil penalty power to FERC states
that:
Any person who violates any provision of
subchapter II of this chapter or any provision of
any rule or order thereunder shall be subject to a
39.
See id. (stating that the new provisions are broad, ensure
market transparency, and prohibit market manipulation).
40.
See 151 CONG. REC. S9255-01, S9270, (daily ed. July 28, 2005)
(“The energy bill includes vitally important measures to boost renewable energy
and energy efficiency, to improve our electricity grid, and to protect consumers
from bad corporate actors like Enron.”).
41.
See Statement by the President on Energy Policy Act of 2005,
2005 WL 1864962 (August 8, 2005) (“Today, I have signed into law H.R. 6, the
‘Energy Policy Act of 2005.’”).
42.
See 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2014) (granting the power to punish
market manipulation).
43.
See 16 U.S.C. § 825o-1 (2014) (granting the power to assess
fines and criminal penalties for market manipulation violations).
44.
16 U.S.C. § 824v (2014).
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civil penalty of not more than $1,000,000 for each
day that such violation continues. Such penalty
shall be assessed by the Commission, after notice
and opportunity for public hearing, in accordance
with the same provisions as are applicable under,
section 823b(d) of this title in the case of civil
penalties assessed under section 823b of this title.
In determining the amount of a proposed penalty,
the Commission shall take into consideration the
seriousness of the violation and the efforts of such
person to remedy the violation in a timely
manner.45
FERC anti-manipulation cases use the procedure outlined
in the Federal Power Act.46 There are two procedural avenues a
regulated entity can take when issued an order assessing
penalties.47 First, the company can elect to go before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for a hearing under Section
31(d)(2).48 If the ALJ affirms the Commission’s proposed penalty,
the regulated entity has the option to appeal to the appropriate
United States Court of Appeals who can affirm, modify, or set
aside the Commission’s order. 49
Second, when a regulated entity is sent notice of a
proposed penalty under Section 31(d)(1) of the Federal Power Act,
the entity may elect in writing within 30 days that it wishes to
skip the agency hearing.50 If the entity chooses to skip the agency
hearing, FERC will immediately assess civil penalties without an
agency hearing.51 Under Section 31(d)(3), if the company does not
45.
16 U.S.C. § 825o-1 (2014).
46.
See 16 U.S.C. § 823b(d) (2014) (outlining procedural options
under the Federal Power Act for anti-manipulation cases).
47.
See id. § 823b(d)(1) (providing for the election to skip the
administrative proceeding by notifying the agency in writing within 30 days).
48.
See id. § 823b(d)(2)(A) (providing agency proceedings for a
regulated entity that does not elect to skip agency proceedings).
49.
See id. § 823b(d)(2)(B) (allowing a party unsatisfied with the
agency proceeding to appeal to the proper Court of Appeal).
50.
See id. § 823b(d)(1) (allowing a regulated entity to “elect in
writing within 30 days after the date of receipt of such notice to have the
procedures” avoided in exchange for a Commission assessment.).
51.
See id. § 823b(d)(3)(A) (“[T]he Commission shall promptly
assess such penalty, by order, after the date of the receipt of the notice . . . .”).
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pay the penalty FERC orders within 60 days, FERC will file suit
in a federal district court seeking an affirmance of the
Commission’s assessed penalty.52 Barclays and its traders elected
to take this procedural route. 53

III. FERC’S Promulgation of the Anti-Manipulation Rule
After the EPAct was passed, FERC promulgated rules
implementing the newly enacted statutes.54 FERC used two
different methods to implement the statute. First, FERC went
through the typical agency rulemaking procedure with a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”),55 public comment period56 and a
Final Rulemaking (“Final Rule”) addressing the changes and
comments.57 Second, FERC issued various Policy Statements to
help regulated entities understand different aspects of FERC’s
investigative and enforcement process.58
52.
See id. § 823b(d)(3)(B) (“If the civil penalty has not been paid
within 60 calendar days after the assessment order has been made . . . the
Commission shall institute an action in the appropriate district court of the
United States for an order affirming the assessment of the civil penalty.”).
53.
See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, supra note 99, at 9 (“On
November 29, 2012, Respondents each gave notice of their election under section
31(d)(3)(A) of the FPA and the Order to Show Cause, thereby electing an
immediate penalty assessment if the Commission finds a violation.”).
54.
See NOPR, supra note 21, at 6 (stating that the antimanipulation rule was meant to fulfill Congress’ intent that FERC promulgate
rules prohibiting market manipulation).
55.
See id. (proposing regulations implementing EPAct 2005).
56.
See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg.
4244, 4246 (January 26, 2006) [hereinafter “Final Rule”] (to be codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 1c.2) (“Thirty parties filed comments and nine parties filed reply
comments.”).
57.
See id. (“[T]his final rule serves as the implementing provision
designed to prohibit manipulation and fraud in the markets the Commission is
charged with regulating.”).
58.
See, e.g., Policy Statement on Enforcement, Docket No. PL0601, 113 FERC ¶ 61,068, 61,243 (October 20, 2005) [hereinafter “October Policy
Statement”]; Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123
FERC ¶ 61,156, 62,008 (May 15, 2008) [hereinafter “May Policy Statement”];
Compliance with Statutes, Regulations, and Orders, Docket No. PL09-1, 125
FERC ¶ 61,058, 1 (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter “Compliance Policy Statement”];
Enforcement of Statutes, Order, Rules, and Regulations, Policy Statement on
Penalty Guidelines, Docket No. PL10-4, 130 FERC ¶ 61,220, 1 (March 18, 2010)
[hereinafter “March Penalty Guidelines”]; Revised Policy Statement on Penalty
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First, this section discusses the FERC’s rulemaking
procedure through the NOPR, public comment period, and the
Final Rule.59 Second, this section discusses the Policy Statements
that FERC has issued identifying its internal procedure for
finding violations. 60 Third, this section discusses the FERC’s
Policy Statements identifying its positions on compliance and
penalty guidelines.61

A. Rulemaking Proceeding
On October 20, 2005, FERC issued its NOPR. Because
Section 1283 of the EPAct was not self-actuating, FERC had to
promulgate rules implementing the intent of Congress.62 The
NOPR set out the proposed elements of a violation of the market
manipulation rule and defined the phrase “any entity” in the
statute to mean “regulated utilities but also governmental
utilities and other market participants.”63 The rulemaking
invited comment on the proposed elements.64
The NOPR indicated that anti-manipulation issues should
be considered in light of SEC Rule 10b-5 because much of the
language of Section 1283 of the EPAct closely mirrors the
language of Rule 10b-5.65 By adopting established Rule 10b-5
precedent from the SEC, FERC and Congress hoped regulated
entities would gain guidance about how to comply with the
manipulation rule.66 The SEC has a large body of precedent
Guidelines, 132 FERC 61,216, ¶ 1 (Sep. 17, 2010) [hereinafter “September Policy
Statement”].
59.
See infra Part III.A (discussing FERC’s rule promulgation).
60.
See infra Part III.B (explaining how an investigation is started,
how the Office of Enforcement makes decisions, and how the Commission adopts
decisions).
61.
See infra Part III.C (analyzing FERC’s policy statements
issued on penalty guidelines and compliance).
62.
See NOPR, supra note 21, at 2 (stating that neither of the
statutes Congress passed were self-actuating and the rule was promulgated to
fulfill Congress’ intent).
63.
Id. at 2.
64.
See id. at 1 (“The Commission seeks public comment on its
proposals for the regulations . . . .”).
65.
See id. at 3 (“The Commission proposes to pattern proposed
sections 47.1 and 159.1 of its regulations on the text of Rule 10b-5.”).
66.
See id. at 3 (stating reliance on 10b-5 “should benefit the
industry because it will provide greater certainty to entities subject to the new
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regarding the rule, and it is a highly litigated administrative
provision.67 FERC stated in the NOPR that its anti-manipulation
rule would be interpreted with the precedent of Rule 10b-5.68
On January 19, 2006, FERC issued its Final Rule. 69
Because EPAct does not prohibit any actual conduct, the Final
Rule prohibited conduct in violation of the market manipulation
and fraud rules within the markets that FERC regulates.70 The
rulemaking states explicitly that it is not meant to reach
negligent practice or corporate mismanagement.71 It also
reiterated that the rule was based on SEC Rule 10b-5.72
In response to the NOPR, thirty parties filed comments
and nine parties filed reply comments.73 Overall, FERC believed
the comments were positive toward the anti-manipulation rule. 74
The six areas that the commenters emphasized were (1) scope, (2)
usefulness of SEC precedent, (3) disclosure implications, (4)
elements of a violation, (5) the Final Rule’s interaction with the

rules because the Commission intends to rely on the large body of case law
interpreting and applying section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when applying its new
authority.”).
67.
See id. (describing the large amount of precedent interpreting
rule 10b-5).
68.
See id. (“[T]he Commission intends to rely on the large body of
case law interpreting and applying section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when applying
its new authority.”).
69.
See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg.
4244-03, 4246 (January 26, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 1c.2) (“[T]his
final rule serves as the implementing provision designed to prohibit
manipulation and fraud in the markets the Commission is charged with
regulating.”).
70.
See id. (“[T]he language of EPAct 2005 sections 315 and 1283
does not, by itself, make any particular act unlawful.”).
71.
See id. (“The final rule is not intended to regulate negligent
practices or corporate mismanagement, but rather to deter or punish fraud in
wholesale energy markets.”).
72.
See id. (“These anti-manipulation sections of EPAct 2005
closely track the prohibited conduct language in section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .”).
73.
See id. (“The 30 initial comments and nine reply comments on
the NOPR are from a diverse group of industry stakeholders.”).
74.
See id. (“Overwhelmingly, commenters are supportive of our
efforts to implement well-developed, clear and fair rules aimed at eliminating
the potential for fraud in wholesale energy transactions.”).
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market behavior rules, and (6) procedural issues including the
statute of limitations.75
Commenters’ concern about the scope of the Final Rule
mainly grew from concerns over whether the language of the rule
should be interpreted broadly or narrowly.76 Each clause of the
rule was raised.77 In response, FERC stated that a reasonable
interpretation of the terms required reading each of the terms of
the rule as they relate to each other.78 FERC stated that the term
“any entity” should be broadly construed.79 FERC asserted that it
applies to parties outside FERC’s jurisdictional reach. 80 The
language that limits FERC to its expertise is the “in connection
with a transaction” language.81 While any entity could violate the
manipulation rule, the rule would not apply to an entity that
violated the rule in a transaction outside FERC’s jurisdiction.82
Commenters expressed more concern about the
application of SEC precedent to the market manipulation rule. 83
The main concern was that the SEC rules are meant to protect
different parties than those protected by the FERC rule. 84 The

75.
See id. at 4246–47 (listing the six areas).
76.
See id. at 4247 (describing arguments by commenters about
the breadth of various aspects of the rule).
77.
See id. at 4248–49 (discussing comments that touch on each
element of the proposed rule).
78.
See id. at 4248 (“The answer to the scope of application of the
final rule lies in a reasonable reading of these terms in relation to each other.”).
79.
See id. (“‘Any entity’ is a deliberately inclusive term.”).
80.
See Kelliher, supra note 20, at 16 (2005) (noting that FERC
would like the rule to apply outside of its normal jurisdiction).
81.
See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg.
4244-03, 4249 (January 26, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 1c.2) (“[T]he
Commission views the “in connection with” element in the energy context as
encompassing situations in which there is a nexus between the fraudulent
conduct of an entity and a jurisdictional transaction.”).
82.
See id. (“We do not intend to construe the Final Rule sobroadly
as to convert every common-law fraud that happens to touch a jurisdictional
transaction into a violation of the final rule.”)
83.
See id. (“Commentators are divided as to whether we should
model the proposed anti-manipulation regulations after SEC rule 10b-5.”).
84.
See id. (“Many of the commentators also argue that the
participants in energy markets are highly sophisticated . . . unlike less
sophisticated participants in the securities markets. . . .”).
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SEC rules protect unknowing investors in securities. 85
Conversely, FERC’s anti-manipulation rule regulates a market
with more experienced investors. 86 However, other commenters
argued that the sophistication of the traders in the market should
not matter because EPAct’s purpose was to protect the consumers
of electricity and not traders.87 The Commission took account of
both sides of the argument and determined that in light of the
explicit guidance of Congress, it would use SEC precedent in
analogous cases.88
Next, the Commission rejected the proposed changes
regarding both the duty to disclose and additions to intent.89 The
Commission addressed concerns from regulated entities that
additional duties to disclose and penalties for omissions of
material fact would place a larger burden on regulated entities. 90
The Commission stated that the new rule does create an
additional duty to disclose and that omissions of material fact
between bilateral contracting parties will not necessarily be
pursued as violations.91 Some of the commenters requested a
more explicit enunciation of the intent requirement.92 However,
the Commission relied on SEC Rule 10b-5’s unchanged scienter

85.
See id. (“[T]he securities model is one of disclosure, designed in
large part to protect novice investors by eliminating disparities in access to
information . . . .”).
86.
See id. (“[T]he commenters also argue that the participants in
energy markets are largely sophisticated, and unlike less-sophisticated
participants in the securities markets, do not need the protections of a
disclosure regime.”).
87.
See id. at 4250 (“[T]he level of sophistication of the parties to a
bilateral negotiation is irrelevant because the Commission’s anti-manipulation
rules are not to protect the contracting parties from each other, but to protect
the consumers who rely on the market for their energy supplies.”).
88.
See id. (“We intend to adapt analogous securities precedents as
appropriate to specific facts, circumstances, and situations that arise in the
energy industry.”).
89.
See id. at 4251 (“The Commission declines to modify the
proposed regulations in this final rule.”).
90.
See id. at 4250 (identifying a possible new duty of disclosure
and penalties for omissions as concerns from regulated entities).
91.
See id. at 4251–52 (stating there is no additional duty to
disclose and rejecting proposals to delete or modify the rule regarding omissions
of material fact).
92.
See id. at 4252 (stating commenters requested FERC
“explicitly . . . include the element of intent . . . .”).
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requirement to justify not including a more explicit intent
element in a violation.93
The Commission accepted commenters’ request to clarify
the required elements for a violation of the manipulation rule. 94
As a general clarification, the Commission again stated that the
elements are largely based on the requirements needed to violate
Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.95 FERC briefly outlined the
meaning of the elements.96 For the scienter element, because the
Courts of Appeal have allowed recklessness to satisfy Rule 10b5’s scienter requirement, recklessness also satisfies the scienter
requirement for the manipulation rule.97
The Commission declined to clarify whether it would
abolish or continue to use the market behavioral rules. 98
However, it stated that it would not seek to enforce both the
market behavior and manipulation rules for the same violation.99
The Commission also rejected commenters’ call for an explicit
statute of limitations for the manipulation rule.100 The
Commission noted that none of the SEC enforcement actions, the
Federal Power Act or the National Gas Act, are subject to any
statute of limitations other than the general five-year statute of
limitations for actions enforcing civil penalties.101 The
93.
See id. (“SEC Rule 10b-5 has an analogous section that has
remained unchanged since it was adopted in 1942, and there is abundant
securities law precedent that highlights the ongoing relevance of that section.”).
94.
See id. at 4253 (“The Commission generally agrees that
clarification of the elements of a violation under the final rule would reduce
regulatory uncertainty and thereby assure greater compliance.”).
95.
See id. (stating that the elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim serve a
useful purpose when analyzing a anti-manipulation claim).
96.
See id. at 4253–54 (discussing each element briefly or
incorporating previous discussion of an element).
97.
See id. at 4254 (“[T]he Commission concludes that recklessness
satisfies the scienter element of the final rule.”).
98.
See id. (stating that the market behavior rules were still in
effect and notification of repeal would be sent if they were repealed).
99.
See id. (“[T]he Commission will not seek duplicative sanctions
for the same conduct in the event that conduct violates both the Market
Behavior Rules and this final rule.”).
100.
See id. at 4255 (“The Commission declines to designate a
statute of limitations or otherwise adopt an arbitrary time limitation on
complaints or enforcement actions that may arise under NGA section 4A and
FPA section 222.”).
101.
See id. at 4254–55 (declining to adopt any statute of limitation
other than the general five year statute of limitation).
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Commission also refused to give specific examples of market
manipulation or assert that certain actions were permissible. 102
The Commission stated that the procedures to be used are
already established in the Commission’s precedent and rejected
claims that it needed to explicitly describe procedures in the text
of the rule.103
The only major change to the text of the rule from the
NOPR to the Final Rule was the change from “person” to
“entity.”104 Commenters expressed concern that under the
definition of “person” in the Federal Power Act,105 fraud and
manipulation conducted by organizations like municipalities
would be actionable while actions taken against the same
organizations would not be violations.106 The Commission agreed
with the commenters that this oversight would be unfair and
changed the wording of the Final Rule to include entities.107
The Final Rule went into effect January 19, 2006.108 The
rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any entity, directly or
indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale
of electric energy or the purchase or sale of
transmission services subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission, (1) to use or employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the
102.
See id. at 4255 (declining to give concrete examples of
acceptable behavior or adopt commenters’ examples as acceptable behavior).
103.
See id. at 4256 (“[T]he Commission will process the filing
under the procedures currently set forth in Rule 206 of the Rules of Practice and
Procedure.”).
104.
See id. (“Accordingly, the Commission will substitute the word
“entity” for “person” in sections 1c.1(a)(3) and 1c.2(a)(3) of the final rule.”).
105.
See 16 U.S.C. § 796(4) (2014) (defining person as “an individual
or a corporation”).
106.
See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg.
4244-03, 4256 (January 26, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 1c.2) (describing
a commenter’s argument that under the proposed section would punish
municipalities but not allow them to qualify as victims).
107.
See id. (“[T]he Commission will substitute the word ‘entity’ for
‘person’ in sections 1c.1(a)(3) and 1c.2(a)(3) of the final rule.”).
108
18 C.F.R. § 1c. (2014).
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statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (3)
to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any entity.109

B. FERC’S Anti-Manipulation Enforcement Procedure
FERC has created a complicated procedural structure to
oversee potential market manipulation.110 FERC settles 75% of
its cases before they become public through procedures outlined
in Policy Statements.111 On October 20, 2005, along with its Final
Rule, FERC issued its first Policy Statement.112 A Policy
Statement is not a rule with force of law; it is a guidance
document meant to give regulated entities an idea how FERC
plans to enforce the rules it implements.113 FERC’s May 15, 2008
Policy Statement also provides guidance on enforcement
procedures.114 An investigation begins in the Office of
Enforcement, where it attempts to settle the case, and if the

109.
Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg.
4244-03, 4258 (January 26, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 1c.2).
110.
See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶
61,156, 62,010 (May 15, 2008) (describing “the steps involved in an audit and
the steps involved in an investigation”).
111.
See id. (“[B]etween 2005 and 2007, Enforcement staff closed
approximately 75 percent of its investigations without any sanctions being
imposed.”).
112.
See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC
¶ 61,068, 61,243 (October 20, 2005) (“The Commission issues this Policy
Statement to provide guidance and regulatory certainty regarding our
enforcement of the statutes, orders, rules, and regulations we administer.”).
113.
See id. (“Our purpose is to provide firm but fair enforcement of
our rules and regulations and to place entities subject to our jurisdiction on
notice of the consequences of violating the statutes, orders, rules, and
regulations we enforce.”).
114.
See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶
61,156, 62,010 (May 15, 2008) (“[T]he non-public nature of much of Enforcement
staff's work, coupled with the potential for the imposition of significant
monetary penalties, argues for a fuller explication than we have yet provided as
to how we conduct our investigations and determine the imposition of remedies,
including civil penalties.”).

214

6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 1 (2014)

Office does not, it gives a recommendation to the Commission. 115
The Commission then decides whether to issue an order to show
cause while continuing to attempt to settle with the regulated
entity.116 If an order to show cause is issued, the regulated entity
must decide whether it wants to submit to a hearing in front of
an ALJ.117 If it does not want to go through the agency
proceeding, it can force FERC to issue an Order Assessing Civil
Penalties and file to have the order affirmed in a federal district
court.118
On October 20, 2005, FERC issued a statement that
outlined factors FERC would use to make decisions about
enforcement proceedings and assessment of penalties. 119 The
Commission believed that in light of the enhanced power it
received under EPAct, it should explicitly state its policies on
cooperation and other mitigating factors.120 The Commission
noted that the past policies of other agencies have defied
formulas and looked at cases individually.121 In the same way,

115.
See id. at 62,012 (“By regulation, Enforcement staff is
authorized to initiate and conduct investigations relating to any matter subject
to our jurisdiction.”).
116.
See id. at 62,014 (“Following issuance of the Order to Show
Cause, potential settlement may proceed in accordance with the requirements of
Rule 602 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.”).
117.
See 16 U.S.C. § 823b(d) (2014) (providing for notice to the
regulated entity that they may elect to skip agency proceedings or have a
hearing in front of an ALJ).
118.
See id. § 823b(d)(3)(B) (“[T]he Commission shall institute an
action in the appropriate district court of the United States for an order
affirming the assessment of the civil penalty.”).
119.
See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC
¶ 61,068, 61,243 (October 20, 2005) (“The Policy Statement discusses the factors
we will take into account in determining remedies for violations, including
applying the enhanced civil penalty authority provided by the Energy Policy Act
of 2005.”).
120.
See id. (stating that given its new authority, FERC wanted to
“assure the industry that we will temper strong enforcement measures with
consideration of all relevant factors, including mitigating factors, in determining
the appropriate remedies.”).
121.
See id. at 61,245 (noting that the SEC and CFTC penalty
schemes “emphasized the importance of considering a range of factors that may
lead to different penalty decisions depending on the circumstances presented by
each case.”).
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FERC would not commit to a specific formula and would
emphasize flexibility.122
The October Policy Statement outlines a two-step process
to determine the penalty for a violation. 123 Each step lists factors
used to analyze the regulated entity’s conduct.124 The first step
considered is the seriousness of the offense.125 Some factors
include who committed the violation, what type of harm resulted
from the violation, and whether the violation was willful.126 The
second step is what the regulated entity did to remedy the
problem.127 Mitigating factors include internal compliance, selfreporting a violation, and cooperative conduct.128 Cooperative
conduct can reduce a penalty even if the entity did not selfreport.129 None of the mitigating factors in step two apply to
reduce disgorgement of unjust profits because the harm has
already occurred. 130
On May 15, 2008, FERC issued a revised statement on
enforcement. The statement is meant to give regulated entities
an idea how FERC determines if a penalty is warranted and how
its investigative process works. 131 The Commission felt that

122.
See id. at 61,246 (“[W]e will not prescribe specific penalties or
develop formulas for different violations.”).
123.
See id. at 61,245 (identifying the seriousness of the offense and
timely efforts to remedy the violation as the most important factors).
124.
See id. at 61,247–49 (listing factors FERC will use to interpret
different aspects of the process to determine a penalty).
125.
See id. at 61,246 (“[T]he seriousness of the violation is the first
touchstone for our determination of the level of penalty to be imposed.”).
126.
See id. at 61,247 (listing factors used to determine the
seriousness of the offense).
127.
See id. (“The second point to be taken into account as required
by section 316A of the FPA and new section 22 of the NGA is what efforts the
company made to remedy the violation in a timely manner.”).
128.
See id. at 61,247–49 (listing factors used to determine the
effect of the three aspects oftimely remedy).
129.
See id. at 61,248 (“[T]he Commission will consider these
factors even for entities that did not self-report violations, provided that
cooperation was provided once the violation was uncovered.”).
130.
See id. at 61,247 (“[A]t a minimum a company involved in
wrongdoing must disgorge any unjust profits resulting from the wrongdoing.”).
131.
See Stuart Caplan et al., What Invigorated FERC and FCPA
Enforcement Activity Means for US Energy Companies, ASPATORE, 2014 WL
10387, 3 (Jan. 2014) (“The Revised Enforcement Policy Statement gives
regulated entities a better understanding of how FERC’s investigative process
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because only enforcement actions that ended in penalties became
public, the Commission needed to issue the Policy Statement.132
The revised statement updates FERC’s polices from the 2005
Policy Statement.133
FERC’s Office of Enforcement receives cases from internal
and external sources.134 Before deciding whether to open an
investigation, the Office reviews the details of the potential case
and may look at additional available information.135 If the Office
determines that that there is a basis for an investigation, it
informs the regulated entity that it will open an investigation. 136
If no basis for an investigation exists, the regulated entity is
notified that there will not be an investigation.137
If an investigation is opened, regulated entities are only
allowed to communicate with specifically designated staff. 138
FERC does have and use the discovery process to gather facts and

works and provides details on the factors FERC considers in determining
whether a penalty is warranted.”).
132.
See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3-000, 123 FERC
¶ 61156, 62,010 (May 15, 2008) (stating that the regulated community did not
have a sense for the enforcement actions that did not result in penalties and
wanted to give regulated entities a better sense of enforcement procedures).
133.
See id. at 1–2 (describing the 2005 policy statement and the
reasons why it needed to be supplemented).
134.
See id. at 6 (listing sources of investigations including the
Division of Audits, Division of Energy Market Oversight, other Commission
offices, and referrals from market monitors).
135.
See id. (stating that before an investigation begins, staff look
at information included the referral information and potentially information
from outside sources or the regulated entity).
136.
See id. at 7 (“If . . . staff determines that an investigation
should be opened, it will notify the subject of that fact.”).
137.
See id. (“If . . . staff determines that an investigation is not
warranted, it will so notify the subject of the inquiry, assuming the subject is
aware that an investigation is under consideration.”).
138.
See id. at 9 (“[N]either the Commissioners nor their assistants
will receive oral communications . . . from any person concerning an ongoing
staff investigation as to which such person is the subject.”); see also Suedeen
Kelly & Julia E. Sullivan, Navigating the FERC Enforcement Process,
ASPATORE, 2014 WL 10384, 7 (2014) (“Staff members involved in the
investigation are designated as ‘non-decisional,’ which means they may not have
off-the-record communications concerning the investigation with ‘decisional
staff.’” ).
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data during an investigation.139 At any time during the
investigation, Office of Enforcement staff can close an
investigation.140 Enforcement staff can settle cases with consent
from the Commission and attempt to do so before recommending
that the Commission issue an Order to Show Cause.141 JP
Morgan settled with FERC at this stage.142 When settlement
occurs at this stage, a Stipulation and Consent Agreement
between the regulated entity and staff is released publicly. 143
When the Office of Enforcement and the regulated entity
cannot reach a settlement, the Office of Enforcement recommends
the Commission issue an Order to Show Cause.144 The regulated
entity is notified that it may attempt to demonstrate why the
Commission should not issue an Order to Show Cause.145 If the
Commission decides to issue the Order to Show Cause, the
settlement discussion can take place between the regulated entity
and the Commission.146 If the parties do not reach a settlement
by that point, the statute governing the violation at issue takes
139.
See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶
61,156, 62,014–15 (May 15, 2008) (describing FERC’s discovery processes and
mechanisms during an investigation).
140.
See id. at 62,013 (“At any time during the course of its
investigation, staff may determine to close the investigation without taking any
further action.”).
141.
See id. (stating that when staff does not close an investigation
“staff requests settlement authority from the Commission and, in that request,
seeks authority to negotiate within a range of potential civil penalties and/or
disgorgement.”).
142.
See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement,
Docket No. IN 11-8 & IN 13-5, 142 FERC ¶ 61,041, 1 [hereinafter “JP Morgan
Consent Agreement”] (July 30, 2013) (stating that Office of Enforcement staff
reached a settlement with JP Morgan and describing the Office of Enforcement’s
investigation).
143.
See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶
61,156, 62,014 (May 15, 2008) (“Upon approval, the Stipulation and Consent
Agreement and the order approving the settlement are generally released
publicly.”).
144.
See id. (“[S]taff may recommend that the Commission initiate
enforcement proceedings.”).
145.
See id. (“[T]he subject . . . may make a submission to the
Commission to present its case as to why an Order to Show Cause should not
issue.”).
146.
See id. (“Following issuance of the Order to Show Cause,
potential settlement may proceed in accordance with the requirements of Rule
602 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.”).
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over.147 The statute at issue in an anti-manipulation claim is
section 31(d) of the Federal Power Act. 148 Once Section 31(d)
becomes the governing statute, the regulated entity has three
options: it can pay the fine, refuse to pay the fine and go through
agency proceedings, or refuse to pay the fine and force FERC to
file in Federal District Court.149
The Commission also addressed how it arrives at remedies
in a given situation. FERC emphasized that its disgorgement of
profits policies remained the same, and that the Commission did
not believe that it should employ a penalty schedule to decide the
amount of civil penalties to impose for a violation.150 The
headings for the factors FERC takes into account are the
seriousness of the offense, commitment to compliance, selfreporting, cooperation, and reliance on staff guidance.151
Seriousness of the offense and commitment to compliance remain
the most important factors.152 The Commission retained all the
seriousness of offense factors it listed in the 2005 Policy
Statement, added additional factors, and gave a list of questions
regulated entities can ask to determine if they have a good
compliance culture.153 The factors for self-reporting and

147.
See id. (“In the event there is no settlement, the proceeding
will continue according to the process prescribed by the particular statute
governing the violation at issue, as well as in accordance with any additional
procedures set forth by the Commission in orders issued in the particular
proceeding.”).
148.
See Process for Assessing Civil Penalties, 117 FERC ¶ 61,317,
1–2 (Dec. 21, 2006) (describing the statutes that govern violation of the Federal
Power Act).
149.
See 16 U.S.C. § 823b(d) (2014) (providing that after the Order
to Show Cause a regulated entity may pay its fine, go to a hearing with an ALJ,
or elect to take FERC to federal court).
150.
See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶
61,156, 62,014–17 (May 15, 2008) (describing disgorgement in addition to civil
penalties and reaffirming the approach of the 2005 statement).
151.
See id. at 62017 (“[T]he factors we consider in determining
whether a civil penalty should be imposed . . . are grouped under the following
headings: seriousness of the offense, commitment to compliance, self-reporting,
cooperation, and reliance on staff guidance.”).
152.
See id. (“Of these factors, the most important in determining
the amount of the penalty are the seriousness of the offense and the strength of
the entity's commitment to compliance.”).
153.
See id. (adding factors including the efficient working of the
market, earnings and market share of a company under investigation, the best
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C. Other Information FERC Has Provided to Regulated
Entities through Policy Statements
FERC has also issued guidance on topics besides
procedure. It issued a Policy Statement on compliance and two
Policy Statements adopting penalty guidelines.155 First, on
October 16, 2008, FERC issued a revised statement on
compliance meant to help regulated entities maintain compliance
with FERC’s rules.156 In the Policy Statement, the FERC outlined
four main factors that it uses.157 The factors are “(1) the role of
senior management in fostering compliance; (2) effective
preventive measures to ensure compliance; (3) prompt detection,
cessation, and reporting of violations; and (4) remediation
efforts.”158 Each factor is discussed in detail.159 The policy
statement also includes additional information on how
compliance affects penalties. 160
Second, on March 18, 2010, FERC issued an order
adopting penalty guidelines. 161 The guidelines are modeled after
the federal sentencing guidelines for organizations and are meant
penalty that discourages improper conduct without discouraging market
participation, and the motivation of the improperly acting entity).
154.
See id. (“We carry forward from the 2005 Policy Statement the
factors we examine in determining the credit to be given for self-reporting.”).
155.
See generally Compliance Policy Statement, Docket No. PL091, 125 FERC ¶ 61,058, 1 (Oct. 16, 2008); see also March Penalty Guidelines,
Docket No. PL10-4, 130 FERC ¶ 61,220, 1 (March 18, 2010); September Policy
Statement, 132 FERC ¶ 61,216, 62,117 (Sep. 17, 2010).
156.
See Caplan, supra note 133, at 3 (“On October 16, 2008, FERC
issued a Policy Statement on Compliance to provide guidance to regulated
entities with respect to FERC's governing statutes, regulations and orders.”).
157.
See Compliance Policy Statement, Docket No. PL09-1, 125
FERC ¶ 61,058, 1 (Oct. 16, 2008) (listing the four factors).
158.
Id.
159.
See id. at 4–6 (discussing and giving guidance on each factor).
160.
See id. at 6–7 (explaining the effect of the factors on penalties
but emphasizing that all determinations are on a case by case basis).
161.
See March Penalty Guidelines, Docket No. PL10-4, 130 FERC
¶ 61,220, 1 (March 18, 2010) (“The Commission issues this Policy Statement on
Penalty Guidelines for the purpose of adding greater fairness, consistency, and
transparency to our civil penalty determinations.”).
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to provide more transparency and fairness when imposing
penalties.162 Although FERC originally denied requests to create
penalty guidelines, eventually FERC decided to adopt
guidelines. 163 FERC emphasized that the sentencing guidelines
are patterned after the same seriousness of violation and efforts
to remedy as is required of FERC in the EPAct.164 FERC believes
that the objective requirement of the penalty guidelines will help
create uniformity as the Commission manages a growing number
of enforcement actions.165
Under the penalty guidelines for organizations, there is a
two-step process to determine a fine. First, FERC comes up with
a base fine depending on the organization’s gain, loss created, or
a statutory mandate.166 Second, FERC comes up with a multiplier
based on the organization’s culpability.167 The culpability of the
organization is based on a list of factors.168 After the base fine and
multiplier are calculated, the two numbers are added together to
get the amount of the fine.169 Although one stated disadvantage is
that FERC has less discretion to assess fines on a case-by-case
basis, FERC asserted that it has the ability to deviate from the

162.
See id. (“The Commission’s Penalty Guidelines . . . are modeled
on portions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines . . . with appropriate
modifications to account for Commission-specific considerations.”).
163.
See id. at 2 (“We now believe that it is in the public interest to
advance our past use of the Sentencing Guidelines' principles by implementing a
guidelines approach patterned after the Sentencing Guidelines, which apply
factors in a focused manner to promote fairness and consistency . . . .”).
164.
See id. (“Congress instructs that we must specifically consider
the seriousness of the violation and the efforts a company takes to remedy it.”).
165.
See id. at 9 (“The uniformity of the guidelines approach
reduces the potential disparities in penalties that might otherwise arise for
similar violations committed by similarly situated offenders, particularly
because a uniform approach ensures that similar cases are considered based on
more than just institutional judgment.”).
166.
See id. at 6 (“First, the Sentencing Guidelines require the
calculation of a base fine.”).
167.
See id. (“Second, the Sentencing Guidelines produce a
multiplier range for the base fine . . . .”).
168.
See id. (listing factors like history of compliance, level of
management involved in the offense, self-reporting, and whether the entity had
an effective compliance program).
169.
See id. (“The multiplier and the base fine are then combined to
calculate a fine range for the conduct.”).
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penalty guidelines. 170 The penalty guidelines produce a range for
a fine rather than an exact figure.171 In the end, FERC decided
that the benefits of adopting the guidelines outweighed the
disadvantages.172 The Commission pointed out that the penalty
guidelines do not apply to the amount of disgorged profits a
company must pay, and the penalty guidelines do not apply to
natural persons who violate rules or regulations.173
Third, on September 17, 2010, FERC issued a statement
regarding penalty guidelines.174 The Policy Statement was meant
to respond to comments made by the industry, explain the kind of
weight FERC gives to the factors in the penalty guidelines, and
amend the penalty guidelines in certain places.175 In response to
the Commission suspending the penalty guidelines for sixty days
to receive comments, the Commission received forty-one
comments.176 Many comments related to topics other than antimanipulation enforcement.177 However, FERC stated it departs
from the penalty guidelines on a case-by-case basis, Office of
Enforcement Staff still has the ability to close enforcement
proceedings,178 and compliance is still important for determining
170.
See id. at 10 (“The Penalty Guidelines, however, reduce the
impact of this concern by allowing us to depart from the guidelines where we
deem appropriate.”).
171.
See id. (“[T]he Penalty Guidelines produce a penalty range,
rather than an absolute figure.”).
172.
See id. at 11 (“[W]e believe that the benefits outweigh the
disadvantages and that a guidelines approach to determining penalties is best
for the Commission, organizations, and the public at large.”).
173.
See id. at 18 (describing why the penalty guidelines do not
affect disgorgement of profits and that the Commission does not have much
experience levying fines on individuals).
174.
See Caplan, supra note 131, at 3 (“On September 17, 2010,
FERC issued a Revised Policy Statement on Penalty Guidelines and revised
Penalty Guidelines.”).
175.
See September Policy Statement, 132 FERC ¶ 61,216, 62,117
(Sep. 17, 2010) (stating the reasons that the FERC issued the policy statement).
176.
See id. at 62,118 (“[T]he Commission suspended the Policy
Statement on Penalty Guidelines and application of the Penalty Guidelines to
allow sixty days within which comments could be submitted.”).
177.
See id. (stating that the comments covered a broad range of
subjects).
178.
See id. at 62,121 (“Staff will continue to close all investigations
where no violation is found, and to close some investigations without sanctions
for certain violations that are relatively minor in nature and that result in little
or no potential or actual harm.”).
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a fine.179 Additionally, the points system for compliance type
conduct is broken into different categories. 180 FERC advised that
settlements with FERC count as adjudications in an
organization’s past history.181 The amount of any loss determined
by FERC must be determined under a substantial evidence
burden.182

IV. Recent FERC Enforcement Proceedings
FERC enforces through its Office of Enforcement.
Recently, FERC has engaged in more enforcement proceedings
than ever before.183 Although FERC’s stated overall goal is
compliance, recent investigations of high profile financial
institutions indicate that FERC is not afraid to give out large
fines.184 FERC stated in its fiscal report for 2013 that market
manipulation will continue to be one of its priorities in 2014. 185
FERC noted that in the past year it has approved the largest
settlement in FERC history and issued the largest order
assessing penalties in its history.186 FERC brought in an

179.
See id. at 62,132 (“[U]nder the Penalty Guidelines, an effective
compliance program could result in a ninety-five percent reduction in penalties
when combined with other factors.”).
180.
See id. at 62,137 (“The Commission agrees to modify the
Penalty Guidelines so that the mitigation credits for self-reports, cooperation,
avoidance of trial-type hearings, and acceptance of responsibility are not tied
together.”).
181.
See id. at 62,140 (“The Commission rejects the commenters’
suggestion that we not treat prior settlements as ‘adjudications’ that would
trigger the prior history enhancement under the Penalty Guidelines.”).
182.
See id. at 62,147 (“[T]he Commission is, in fact, required under
the APA to base imposition of any sanction on ‘substantial evidence.’”).
183.
See Caplan, supra note 131, at 1 (“Gas and electric utility
companies are finding themselves the target of heightened scrutiny by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission . . . Office of Enforcement . . . in
connection with their activities in the US energy markets.”).
184.
See id. at 1 (“The past few years suggest, however, that
investigating high profile companies and securing increasingly large
disgorgement and civil penalty remedies has become the OE's main focus.”).
185.
See 2013 Report on Enforcement, Docket No. AD07-13-006, 2–3
(describing policies and overviewing the amount of penalties collected in the
past year).
186.
See id. at 4 (stating that the “Commission approved its largest
settlement to date” and describing the $450 Million fine imposed on Barclays).
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unprecedented $445 million in civil penalties and disgorgement of
profits in the past year and shows no signs of slowing down.187
On January 22, 2013, Deutsche Bank agreed to pay $1.5
million in fines and over $172,000 in disgorgement of profits. 188
Deutsche Bank violated the anti-manipulation rule in the
California Independent System Operator Corporation (“CAISO”)
by trading at a loss in one product to benefit another product. 189
Because the transactions were undertaken at a loss and without
regard for regular market principles, the transactions committed
fraud against the market by artificially moving the Congestion
Revenue Rights Index (“CRR”) in a direction that took away the
risk in Deutsche Bank’s trading.190
On February 1, 2013, FERC entered a stipulation with
Oceanside Power, LLC after it agreed to pay $51,000 in civil
penalties and disgorgement of profits.191 Oceanside violated the
anti-manipulation rule by misusing trades to get a larger share of
a payout based on the share of the amount of power bought in
that hour.192 An Oceanside trader, Robert Scavo, knowingly
bought an extraordinarily large share of the power even though

187.
See id. at 8 (overviewing the amount of penalties collected
through settlements in the past year).
188.
See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement,
Docket No. IN 12-4, 142 FERC ¶ 61,056, 1 (Jan. 22, 2013) (“The Commission
approves the attached Stipulation and Consent Agreement (Agreement)
between the Office of Enforcement (Enforcement) and DB Energy Trading LLC
(Deutsche Bank).”).
189.
See id. at 8 (“Enforcement determined that . . . Deutsche Bank
violated the Commission's Anti-Manipulation Rule by engaging in transactions
in one product . . . with the intent to benefit a second product . . . .”).
190.
See id. at 8 (“Enforcement determined that by hindering the
proper functioning of the CRR and physical markets, which are both
jurisdictional markets, Deutsche Bank's Export Strategy was a scheme that
operated as a ‘fraud or deceit’ under the Commission's Anti-Manipulation
Rule.”).
191.
See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement,
Docket No. IN 10-5,142 FERC ¶ 61,088, 1 (Feb. 1, 2013) (“The Commission
approves the attached Stipulation and Consent Agreement . . . signed by the
Office of Enforcement . . . Oceanside Power, LLC . . . and Robert Scavo.”).
192.
See id. at 2 (“Enforcement determined that Oceanside used the
UTC transaction at the South Imp/South Exp pricing nodes as a pretext to
reserve a large volume of transmission and thereby earn larger share of the
MLSA for the hours in which it submitted a schedule.” ).
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the trades themselves would lose money.193 However, Scavo
bought the power in a type of transaction in a market where he
could lose money on the transactions but make a profit through
the payout from his large market share.194
On March 22, 2013, Rumford Paper agreed to pay $10
million in civil penalties and $2 million in disgorgement of unjust
profits.195 Rumford violated the anti-manipulation rule by taking
advantage of a load reduction program in the ISO-New
England.196 In a plan coordinated by the CEO of another
company, Rumford established a baseline rate of use of its facility
much higher than its normal rate.197 A load-reducing program
operated on the company’s promise to reduce the load when they
bid at a low rate of operation.198 However, Rumford caused its
facility to set a baseline load capacity at its highest possible
rate.199 Because the baseline rate was the highest rate at which
the plant could run, the promise to reduce load capacity was not a
promise to reduce capacity at all.200 Instead, it was a promise to
use the facility as Rumford always did and get paid for reducing
their capacity.201

193.
See id. (“Enforcement determined that from July 29, 2010
through August 4, 2010, Robert Scavo submitted UTC transaction bids at the
“South Imp” and “South Exp” node pair on behalf of Oceanside.”).
194.
See id. at 2–3 (describing Oceanside’s scheme to lose at a fixed
rate and gain on the payout).
195.
See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement,
Docket No. IN 12-11, 142 FERC ¶ 61,218, 1 (Mar. 22, 2013) (“Rumford admits to
the facts set forth in the Agreement, but neither admits nor denies the
allegations and has agreed to a civil penalty of $10,000,000 and disgorgement of
$2,836,419.08.”).
196.
See id. at 1–3 (describing Rumford’s participation in ISO-NE).
197.
See id. at 9 (“[O]nce the baseline was established, Rumford
would operate G4 as it typically had operated.”).
198.
See id. at 8 (“DALRP participants offered load reductions for
the next day from the hours of 7:00 AM through 6:00 PM on non-holiday
weekdays and, if ISO-NE accepted the offer, the participant was obligated to
reduce load the next day.”).
199.
See id. at 11 (“Enforcement found that Rumford's scheme was
based on misrepresentations to ISO-NE about Rumford's typical load . . . .”).
200.
See id. (“Rumford and CES were compensated for load
response that they knew would never occur and in fact never occurred.”).
201.
See id. (“Rumford did not intend to reduce its consumption or
increase its generation once the baseline was established.”).
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On July 30, 2013, FERC and JP Morgan entered a
stipulation agreement.202 The JP Morgan enforcement action is
closest in amount to the current Barclays enforcement.203 FERC
assessed $285 million in civil penalties and $125 million for
disgorgement of profits.204 FERC alleged and JP Morgan
stipulated that in western energy markets, JP Morgan traders
intentionally manipulated the computer systems of CAISO to
receive above market prices for its power generators that
otherwise lost money.205 JP Morgan traders’ conduct included
concealing their scheme when asked directly by CAISO market
monitors and not submitting documents that were truthful to the
profitability of their plants. 206 The JP Morgan traders knew the
plants were not as valuable as the payouts from CAISO and
received daily reports on the payments from CAISO.207

V. FERC’S Enforcement Proceeding Against Barclays
In July of 2007, FERC’s Office of Enforcement notified
Barclays that it was investigating Barclays’ trading practices in

202.
See Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Decree, Docket
No. IN 11-8 & IN13-5, 144 FERC ¶ 61,068, 1 [herein after JP Morgan Consent
Agreement] (July 30, 2013) (“The Commission approves the attached Stipulation
and Consent Agreement . . . between the Office of Enforcement . . . and JP
Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation . . . .”).
203.
See id. (stating FERC assessed $285 million in civil penalties
and $125 million in unjust profits).
204.
See id. (“JPMVEC admits the facts set forth in Section II of the
Agreement, neither admits nor denies the violations set forth in Section III,
agrees to pay a civil penalty of $285,000,000, agrees to disgorge alleged unjust
profits of $125,000,000 . . . .”).
205.
See id. at 12 (“[T]o make profits from power plants that were
usually out of the money, JPMVEC submitted Day Ahead bids that falsely
appeared economic to CAISO and MISO’s automated market software and that
were intended to, and did, lead CAISO and MISO to pay it at rates far above
market prices.”).
206.
See id. at 20 (“When asked by the CAISO MMU why it
submitted negative Day Ahead bids rather than energy self-schedules, JPMVEC
stated that self-scheduling would result in unknowable compensation and could
cause JPMVEC to receive payment at a level that is too low.”).
207.
See id. at 26 (“JPMVEC knew that the ISOs received no
benefit from making inflated payments to JPMVEC, and thus defrauded the
ISOs by obtaining payments for benefits . . . that JPMVEC did not deliver.”).
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Western energy markets.208 The Office of Enforcement staff
began privately investigating Barclays in October of 2008.209 On
October 31, 2012, the Commission issued an Order to Show
Cause, which began a public proceeding against Barclays.210
FERC asserts that Barclays unlawfully manipulated
markets from November 2006 to December 2008 through
Western power traders Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, Karen
Levine, and Ryan Smith.211 FERC alleges that the traders
manipulated FERC regulated physical markets for 655 days. 212
FERC specifically alleges Barclays “traded fixed price products
not in an attempt to profit from the relationship between the
market fundamentals of supply and demand, but instead for the
fraudulent purpose of moving the Index price at a particular
point so that Barclays' financial swap positions at that same
trading point would benefit.”213 Essentially, Barclays traded at a
loss to push the Index to a good position for financial swaps
Barclays owned.214 When Barclays was due to pay on the
financial swaps, the traders would artificially deflate the index,

208.
See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, Docket No. IN08-8, 144
FERC ¶ 61,041, 4 (July 16, 2013) (“On July 3, 2007, OE Staff notified Barclays
that it had begun an investigation of allegations that Barclays and some of its
traders manipulated the electricity markets in and around California beginning
in November 2006.”).
209.
See id. (“The Commission issued a non-public order of formal
investigation on October 2, 2008.”).
210.
See id. (“The Commission issued the Order to Show Cause to
commence this public proceeding on October 31, 2012.”).
211.
See id. at 1 (“On October 31, 2012, the Commission issued an
order directing Barclays Bank . . . Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, Karen Levine,
and Ryan Smith . . . to show cause why they should not be found to have
violated section 1c.2 of the Commission's regulations by manipulating the
electricity markets in and around California from November 2006 to December
2008.”).
212.
See id. at 2 (“Respondents intentionally engaged in an
unlawful scheme to manipulate prices on 655 product days over 35 product
months in the period between November 2006 to December 2008 in the
Commission-regulated physical markets at the four most liquid trading points
in the western United States.”).
213.
Id.
214.
See id. (describing Barclays’ alleged scheme to manipulate
markets to benefit future financial swaps).
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and when Barclays was due to be paid, they would artificially
inflate the index.215
On November 29, 2012, both Barclays and its traders
elected Federal Power Act Section 31(d)(3) that allows FERC to
assess civil penalties, circumventing the entire agency process. 216
Through that procedure, FERC assesses penalties and gives the
parties sixty days to pay the fines.217 If Barclays and the traders
did not pay the fines within sixty days, FERC could file suit in
federal court to ask for an order forcing the parties to pay the
fines.218
On July 16, 2013, FERC issued an Order Assessing Civil
Penalties based on an Office of Enforcement report
recommending penalties.219 In the order, FERC provided
arguments for why Barclays violated the anti-manipulation rule
and addressed some counterarguments Barclays asserted during
the administrative process.220 The order addresses FERC’s
evidence according to three elements required by FERC’s antimanipulation rule.221 FERC adopted a burden shifting analysis to
determine that the Office of Enforcement report established a
prima facie case. 222 To determine the penalty, FERC would follow
the policies as set out in its Policy Statements.223
215.
See id. (“OE Staff has shown that the intended effect of trading
Dailies to flatten the Physical Positions was to influence the daily ICE Index
settlement price at that trading point.”).
216.
See id. at 5 (“On November 29, 2012, Respondents each gave
notice of their election under section 31(d)(3)(A) of the FPA and the Order to
Show Cause, thereby electing an immediate penalty assessment if the
Commission finds a violation.”).
217.
See 16 U.S.C. § 823b(d)(3)(B) (2014) (giving a regulated entity
60 days to pay a fine).
218.
See id. (“[T]he Commission shall institute an action in the
appropriate district court of the United States for an order affirming the
assessment of the civil penalty.”).
219.
See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, Docket No. IN08-8, 144
FERC ¶ 61,041, 75–76 (July 16, 2013) (“The Commission finds that Respondents
violated the Commission's Anti-Manipulation Rule from November 2006 to
December 2008 by manipulating the energy markets in and around California
through the use of a coordinated, fraudulent scheme.”).
220.
See id. at 6–48 (discussing arguments on preliminary issues,
the merits, and the appropriateness of the assessed fine).
221.
See id. at 9–36 (describing the evidence against Barclays
regarding all three elements of the anti-manipulation rule).
222.
See id. at 6 (finding “a prima facie case that Respondents
effectuated a manipulative scheme” which means the “burden, therefore, falls
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After dismissing Barclays’ and its traders’ initial
arguments asserting fairness of process, statute of limitations,
and waiver claims, FERC proceeded to its evidence on the merits
of the case.224 The first element addressed was whether there was
a fraudulent device, scheme, or artifice. 225 The Commission
determines fraud factually and defines it as including “any
action, transaction, or conspiracy for the purpose of impairing,
obstructing or defeating a well-functioning market.”226 FERC
argues that this element is met by a pattern of coordinated
actions by which the traders completed transactions in FERC’s
jurisdictional markets in California to push ICE index prices into
favorable positions for financial swaps.227 FERC relies on the fact
that the losses taken by the traders were avoidable.228 Barclays
and its traders assert multiple defenses based generally on their
belief that FERC’s allegations are cherry-picked and do not
constitute a scheme to commit fraud.229
On the fraud element, Barclays’ first counterargument is
that there is no joint scheme. 230 FERC asserts an email from
Karen Levine, an email from Scott Connelly, and trading data as

upon Respondents to rebut the prima facie case established in the Staff
Report”).
223.
See id. at 5 (stating that the seriousness of the offense and
efforts to remedy the violation are factors to consider).
224.
See id. at 6–8 (discussing burden of proof, fairness of process,
the statute of limitations, and estoppel).
225.
See id. at 9 (“The first element we address in determining
whether there was a violation of the Anti-Manipulation Rule is establishing
whether there was a fraudulent device, scheme, or artifice, or whether there was
a course of business that operated as a fraud.”).
226.
Id. at 11.
227.
See id. at 9 (“OE Staff avers that Respondents engaged in a
coordinated scheme to assemble “substantial” Physical Positions which were
generally in the opposite direction of Respondents' fixed-for-floating Financial
Swaps.”).
228.
See id. at 10 (“OE Staff avers that the execution of Dailies by
Respondents generally produced trading losses which were avoidable.”).
229.
See id. (“Respondents counter that the conduct ‘cherrypicked’ by OE Staff does not equate to a fraudulent device, scheme or artifice in
violation of the Anti-Manipulation Rule nor was it a course of business that
operated or would operate as a fraud in violation of that Rule.”)
230.
See id. (“ Respondents, in defense, argue . . . there is no
evidence of a joint scheme . . . .”).
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evidence of the joint scheme.231 As an example, FERC relies on
Levine’s email to the other traders asking them to ensure that
while she is on vacation, the Index stays high on a position that
Barclays will be paid and low on a position that Barclays must
pay out.232 In response to the email, FERC asserts that Smith
and Brin moved the index and that their response to the email
proves the existence of a joint scheme.233
Barclays also attempts to argue that no pattern exists to
prove a scheme because FERC is cherry picking only certain
trading.234 Barclays attempts to direct FERC to its overall trading
during the alleged months, but FERC asserts that the only
relevant activity is the alleged manipulative activity.235 FERC
believes that Barclays’ trading not in question is irrelevant. 236
The key for FERC is that, in the markets at issue, Barclays
acquired financial positions, which they significantly moved in a
direction beneficial to Barclays.237 FERC asserts that these moves
overwhelm Barclays’ counterargument of any larger picture
trading or daily trading.238 FERC dismisses Barclays’ argument
about profitability because the profitability of daily or monthly
trading is not determinative on the issue of manipulation. 239

231.
See id. at 11–12 (discussing emails and communications
between the traders that FERC argues together satisfy the joint scheme
element).
232.
See id. at 12 (describing a communication Levine sent before
leaving for vacation asking co-workers to trade for her).
233.
See id. (“OE Staff presented evidence that shows Brin and
Smith reversed Physical Positions to support Levine's request.”).
234.
See id. at 13 (“Respondents deny the existence of a pattern of
building and flattening the Physical Positions to the benefit of the Financial
Swaps.”).
235.
See id. at 14 (describing Barclays’ argument that its trading
when taken as a whole does not constitute a pattern of fraudulent conduct).
236.
See id. (“[T]he Commission declines the invitation to view the
trade data in this ‘aggregated’ manner.”).
237.
See id. (“The allegation . . . is that it was the physical markets
at four nodes across 35 product months that were manipulated.”).
238.
See id. (“[T]he record in this case reflects a sustained and
deliberate effort by Respondents first to build Physical Positions in a direction
opposite to their Financial Swaps and then to flatten those Physical Positions in
order to benefit the Financial Swaps.”).
239.
See id. at 15 (“The fact that Respondents’ trading may have
been profitable on a particular day, or in a particular month, however, does not
overcome the weight of evidence . . . .”).
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FERC also rejects Barclays’ support for the position. 240 FERC
stresses that it considers all of the circumstances of the case to
determine a violation.241
Barclays and its traders also attempt to disprove fraud
through Barclays’ ex ante theory.242 Barclays and its traders
assert that the individual traders could not have had the
necessary confidence in the profitability of the swap positions to
risk that the positions might be unprofitable.243 In essence,
Barclays asserts that it is unlikely the traders would take such
positions because they are too risky financially.244 FERC rejects
this argument because the emails between the traders do not
evidence concern about the profitability of their positions. 245
Additionally, FERC argues the emails reflect a misunderstanding
because the traders do not know how buying or selling in large
quantities impacts the market as a whole by taking trades from
other companies.246
Barclays also asserted they could not have violated the
anti-manipulation rule because the trades themselves were
legal.247 FERC asserts the trades can violate the antimanipulation rule if legal trades are made with a manipulative

240.
See id. (rejecting two Commission cases that Barclays asserted
established that trades must be unprofitable to be a violation).
241.
See id. (“[T]he determination of fraud is based on all of the
circumstances in the particular case before the Commission.”).
242.
See id. at 16–18 (describing Barclays’ ex ante theory and
rejecting it).
243.
See id. at 16 (arguing no manipulation because “the benefit to
the financial positions from manipulating the physical market could not have
been anticipated . . . and thus the alleged behavior would be ‘irrational’ and the
traders would lack ‘incentive’ to engage in those trades.”).
244.
See id. (“[T]he traders could not ‘reasonably believe’ that they
would trade Dailies to enhance the Financial Swaps in such a manner as to
result in an overall profit.”).
245.
See id. at 17 (“[T]he communications among the traders
themselves demonstrate that the traders understood that they were moving the
Index to benefit Barclays' financial position.”).
246.
See id. (“Barclays wrongly assumes that its trading Dailies had
no impact on other market participants.”).
247.
See id. at 18 (“Specifically, Barclays states that it is not
possible to defraud market participants in an open market ‘based solely on
transparent bids and offers’”).
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intent.248 FERC cites case authority stating that there is a
difference between a legal transaction with and without the
intent to manipulate a market.249 FERC asserted that the
existence of the emails, unprofitable daily trading, and trading
inconsistent with supply and demand of the market are enough to
satisfy the fraud element of an anti-manipulation claim given an
intent to manipulate the market.250
Having rejected Barclays’ and the traders’ arguments on
the first element, FERC moved on to the scienter element251.
Scienter requires knowing, intentional, or reckless misconduct. 252
FERC argues that this element is satisfied by the trader’s own
emails, suspiciously timed transactions, transactions that
benefitted derivative positions, and irrational economic
conduct.253 FERC alleges that all the traders coordinated in a
scheme to manipulate the market that they understood, expected
to work, and intended to work. 254 Barclays asserts that FERC
must prove its interpretation of the emails and transactions in
question, but FERC argues that because its prima facie case is
met, Barclays has the burden to rebut the prima facie case and
has not.255 FERC goes so far as to say that they do not believe

248.
See id. at 19 (“A number of courts have recognized that
transactions undertaken with manipulative intent, rather than a legitimate
economic motive, send inaccurate price signals to the market . . . .”).
249.
See id. at 18–19 (describing precedent that held lawful trades
could be unlawful if undertaken with manipulative intent).
250.
See id. at 20 (listing the different pieces of evidence that FERC
asserts establishes manipulation).
251.
See id. at 22 (outlining scienter as the second element
necessary to establish a violation of the Anti-Manipulation Rule).
252.
See id. (“[S]cienter requires knowing, intentional, or reckless
misconduct, as opposed to mere negligence.”).
253.
See id. (stating scienter is satisfied because “emails and
instant messages (IMs), suspicious timing or repetition of transactions,
execution of transactions benefiting derivative positions, and lack of legitimate
economic motive or economically irrational conduct”).
254.
See id. (stating the traders “understood how this scheme would
work; that they expected it to work; that they intended it to work”).
255.
See id. (“[I]t is also true that Barclays bears the burden of
rebutting OE Staff's allegations, including its interpretations of the emails and
IMs after OE Staff establishes a prima facie case.”).
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Barclays’ traders’ conduct was merely reckless but was
intentional.256
To support its finding of scienter, FERC first asserts direct
evidence.257 To combat the direct evidence, Barclays asserts that
the evidence does not prove a manipulative scheme but only
intent in specific instances that FERC cannot use to later claim
an overall manipulative intent.258 Also, Barclays does not believe
that FERC established a necessary connection between the
documents it asserts to prove intent and manipulative
transactions by traders.259 FERC believes it did establish a
connection and that appropriate inferences will always be
necessary to prove intent from direct evidence.260
FERC presents direct evidence with respect to each
individual trader. 261 First, with respect to Brin, FERC relies on
instant message communications.262 In the communications, he
tells a friend that his trading is to benefit the long-term positions
that Conelly possesses. 263 Barclays asserts that Brin did not have
the knowledge to participate or design such a scheme, but FERC
rejects that argument because of his explanation to his friend. 264
Second, FERC asserts direct evidence of Smith’s intent
based on a November 3, 2006 instant message in which he
256.
See id. at 23 (“We are satisfied that the scienter element is met
here under even the most stringent definition of ‘recklessness’ because, as
discussed elsewhere in this order, the evidence presented demonstrates that the
conduct was not merely reckless, but intentional.”).
257.
See id. at 25 (discussing whether particular communications
by the traders were directly linked to specific manipulative trades).
258.
See id. (arguing that communications from specific periods of
time in October 2006 and summer 2007 cannot be used to infer Barclays’ intent
to go along with the entire scheme for the entire period of time).
259.
See id. (arguing that the FERC cannot establish a “nexus”
between communications by the traders and resulting manipulative trades).
260.
See id. (stating that Supreme Court precedent assumes that
inferences will be necessary to prove intent).
261.
See id. at 26–34 (outlining communications made by each
trader that FERC believes proves manipulative intent).
262.
See id. at 26–27 (explaining that FERC submitted the instant
message to establish Brin’s state of mind).
263.
See id. (describing instant messages between Brin and a friend
discussing his abnormal trading).
264.
See id. at 27 (“Brin's November 30, 2006 IM exchange and the
additional evidence presented by OE Staff establishes that Brin both understood
the mechanics of the manipulative scheme alleged by OE Staff, and willingly
participated in that scheme.”).
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bragged to another trader that he moved the index to a position
more favorable to Barclays’ financial swap positions. 265 Barclays
attempts to argue that Smith engaged in boastful banter, but
FERC believes his communication shows his direct intent to
involve himself in the scheme.266
Third, FERC asserts that Levine was a part of the scheme
because she sent two emails to colleagues and an instant message
to another trader, who are not charged with manipulating the
market.267 Levine and Barclays argue that these communications
are proof of her intent only if the manipulative scheme is
assumed.268 In one communication, Levine states that one reason
to trade a certain way is to protect a swap position. 269 In two
other communications, Levine requests that colleagues trading on
her behalf attempt to trade in ways that would protect her
financial swap positions. 270 FERC rejects Levine and Barclays’
arguments that the communications do not display manipulative
intent because Levine fails to supply any credible alternative
explanation regarding the communications.271
Fourth, FERC asserts that Connelly, the managing
director of North American power trading, had the necessary
scienter, arguing that three communications and suspect trading
265.
See id. at 28 (describing an instant message in which Smith
states that he messed with the market).
266.
See id. (“[H]is IM chatter, the evidence provides a direct
window into his understanding of the manipulative scheme, even as he was in
the process of implementing it.”).
267.
See id. at 29 (“Both Levine and OE Staff focus their arguments
on the same five communications, but they interpret them in irreconcilable
ways.”).
268.
See id. at 28 (arguing “that the communications cited by OE
Staff contain ‘loose’ or ‘ambiguous’ language, but do not contain a
straightforward admission of any of the elements of what OE Staffhas called the
three-part scheme.”).
269.
See id. at 29 (“[T]he explanation that she offered . . .
‘flattening’ a Physical Position rather than ‘protecting’ a Financial Swap
position lacks credibility, because the broker had already suggested flattening a
Physical Position as . . . possible explanations to which Levine added a third—
protecting a position.”).
270.
See id. (“[W]e view the October 11 IM exchange as an
acknowledgement that the Respondents traded Index in order to protect the
value of Barclays’ Financial Swap Positions.”).
271.
See id. at 30 (rejecting Levine’s arguments because she does
not offer plausible explanations for her communications).
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practices show Connelly’s intent. 272 The communications include
instant messages where Connelly spurns the possibility of his
trading being reported to FERC and an email published
anonymously by The Friday Burrito when the newsletter
questioned trading practices in power markets that involve
moving the index.273 Barclays and Connelly attempt to argue that
(1) the messages show that Connelly did not believe he could
move the index much and (2) he chose to be published
anonymously because he was not allowed to speak to the media
on Barclays’ behalf.274 FERC claims that these arguments are
inconsistent with Connelly’s position and emails.275 FERC further
asserts that the individual traders were personally hired by
Connelly and would not have acted without Connelly’s
approval.276 FERC concluded its scienter argument by stating
that the scienter of the individual traders should be attributed to
Barclays.277
The final element requires that the action be taken in
connection with a transaction subject to the Commission’s
jurisdiction.278 FERC’s general grant of jurisdiction states that
the Commission has authority over “the sale of electric energy at

272.
See id. at 31 (“Barclays and Connelly argue that OE Staff has
not established that Connelly acted with the requisite scienter in connection
with the alleged manipulative scheme.”).
273.
See id. (“There are additional facts, communications, and trade
data which demonstrate that Connelly understood the manipulative strategy
that he both oversaw and personally implemented, and that directly contradict
his current claims of ignorance of the scheme.”).
274.
See id. at 33 (“[A]ny alleged nefarious characterization of such
a request was completely outweighed by the basic reason that he was not
authorized to make public statements or representations to the media on behalf
of Barclays.”).
275.
See id. at 34 (“We find that Connelly acted with actual intent.
We also find that the evidence supports a finding that his conduct satisfies the
lesser ‘recklessness’ standard, however stringently defined.”).
276.
See id. at 31 (“The Individual Traders—whom Connelly
personally hired and had known for years—testified that they traded in
Connelly's book and that they would not have done so without his knowledge
and consent.”).
277.
See id. at 34 (“[W]e find that the knowing or reckless state of
mind of the Individual Traders can and must be attributed to Barclays itself.”).
278.
See id at 35 (“The third element of establishing a violation of
the Anti-Manipulation Rule is determining whether the conduct in question was
“in connection with” a transaction subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.”).
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wholesale in interstate commerce.”279 In addition, the statute that
gives rise to the anti-manipulation rule grants authority over any
entity that manipulates in connection with the purchase or sale
of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 280
Thus, FERC reasons that Barclays sold electric energy at
wholesale within FERC’s grant of jurisdiction, and because the
grant for the manipulation rule includes FERC’s general
jurisdiction, Barclays is subject to FERC’s jurisdiction. 281
Barclays argues that FERC does not have authority over
financially-settled-day-ahead transactions.282 Although FERC
does not explicitly address Barclays’ argument, it contends that
its aforementioned arguments prove FERC’s jurisdiction over the
transactions.283
After considering the evidence, FERC agreed with its
Office of Enforcement and analyzed the issue of whether to adopt
the Office of Enforcement’s recommendation of civil penalties
against Barclays of $435 million, Connelly for $15 million, Brin
for $1 million, Levine for $1 million, Smith for $1 million, and
disgorgement of unjust profits against Barclays of $34.9
million.284 After considering the penalty minimums and
maximums per the penalty guidelines, FERC decided that the
Office of Enforcement’s recommended penalties for Barclays were
appropriate.285 All of the individual traders argued that their

279.
Id.
280.
See 16 U.S.C. § 824(v)(a) (2014) (“It shall be unlawful for any
entity . . . to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of electric
energy . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance . . . .”).
281.
See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, Docket No. IN08-8, 144
FERC ¶ 61,041, 36 (July 16, 2013) (“Respondents traded ‘to affect’ an index
‘which sets the price of both non-jurisdictional and jurisdictional transactions’
and, therefore, they are subject to the Commission's authority under section 222
of the FPA and the Anti-Manipulation Rule.”).
282.
See id. at 35 (“Barclays claims that the Commission has no
jurisdiction over what it describes as the ‘financially-settled day-ahead
transactions’ at issue.”).
283.
See id. (reasoning that (1) FERC does have jurisdiction and (2)
Barclays’ argument is not persuasive).
284.
See id. at 48–49 (listing the penalties assessed against
Barclays and the traders).
285.
See id. at 41 (“After taking into consideration the two statutory
factors of FPA section 316A in light of the evidence presented to us, we find that
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penalties were not appropriate due to their financial status, but
FERC rejected the arguments because of the gravity and nature
of the offenses.286 Barclays disputed the Office of Enforcement’s
disgorgement of profits calculation, but did not suggest a
different figure.287 FERC decided $34.9 million was sufficient,
and that the econometric evidence could be presented to a federal
district judge.288
On October 9, 2013, FERC filed a petition to enforce the
order in the Eastern District of California. 289 This is the first
FERC enforcement action that has reached the federal courts;
accordingly, this action will likely address many significant
issues.290 The federal court will review FERC’s factual and legal
findings de novo.291 The case is pending on a Motion to Dismiss or
Change Venue filed by Barclays along with a supporting brief. 292
FERC filed its opposition to both the Motion to Dismiss and

the penalties recommended by OE Staff are authorized by statute, and
appropriate to the conduct.”).
286.
See id. at 42–46 (describing the traders’ arguments that the
penalties assessed were disproportionate to their financial assets, in addition to
FERC’s rejection of these contentions).
287.
See id. at 46 (“Barclays responds that the recommended
disgorgement is ‘wholly inconsistent with the data available to Barclays’ but
does not propose a different sum.”).
288.
See id. at 48 (“[I]n the absence of competing evidence presented
to us concerning Barclays' profit from the scheme, we find that Barclays should
disgorge $34.9 million in unjust profits, plus interest, from its manipulative
scheme.”).
289.
See Petition for an Order Affirming FERC’s July 16, 2013
Order Assessing Penalties, FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. CV-02093, 1 (E.D.
Cal.
Oct.
9,
2013)
(“Petitioner
Federal
Energy
Regulatory
Commission . . . petitions this Court for an Order Affirming the Commission's
Order Assessing Civil Penalties against Barclays Bank PLC . . . Daniel Brin,
Scott Connelly, Karen Levine, and Ryan Smith . . . .”).
290.
See Fetty, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that because FERC is still
developing its enforcement policies, every decision made regarding the rule will
be important).
291.
See 16 U.S.C. § 823b(d)(3)(B) (2014) (“The court shall have
authority to review de novo the law and the facts involved . . . .”).
292.
See generally Barclays Motion to Dismiss, FERC v. Barclays
Bank PLC, 2013 WL 7045799 (Dec. 16, 2013) (E.D.Cal.) [hereinafter Barclays
Brief] (requesting the court either dismiss the case or change venue to the
Southern District of New York).
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Change of Venue on February 14.293 The Motion is set for hearing
on April 24, 2014.294

VI. Current Posture of the Barclays’ Case
Barclays is the first entity to take FERC to federal court
after being penalized under the market manipulation rule. 295
This section analyzes some of the issues the Barclays case may
decide. Barclays Motion to Dismiss raises several important
issues that are answered in FERC’s opposition motion: (1)
whether FERC has jurisdiction over the transactions at issue
under Hunter v. FERC,296 (2) whether the phrase “any entity”
includes individuals, 297 and (3) whether FERC has stated a claim
under the SEC’s 10b-5 precedent.298 An important issue that
Barclays reserved for later in the case is whether FERC has
enough evidence to prove that its traders acted with intent to
manipulate the market.299
The first argument is that FERC does not have
jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act over the types of trades
made by Barclays.300 This is particularly important in light of the
D.C. Circuit Court’s recent ruling in Hunter, which held that the
293.
See Petitioner’s Opposition, FERC v. Barclays Bank PLC, 2014
WL 988138, at *8–9 (Feb. 14, 2014) [hereinafter FERC Brief] (requesting that
Barclays’ motion be denied in full).
294.
See Barclays Brief, 2013 WL 7045799 at *1 (stating the case is
set for hearing April 24).
295.
See id. at *22 (arguing that the CFTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over accounts, agreements, options, and transactions involving
contracts to sell commodities for future delivery, traded or executed on a
contract market or any other board of trade, exchange, or market) (citing 7
U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2014)).
296.
See id. at *21 (“As the court of appeals made clear in Hunter,
the CFTC’s anti-manipulation authority over futures contracts is exclusive.”);
See generally Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
297.
See id. at *22 (“The plain meaning of the term ‘entity’ does not
include natural persons.”).
298.
See id. at *26 (arguing that FERC has not stated a
manipulation claim).
299.
See id. at *34 n.56 (“[A]ll other objections to the manipulation
claim not raised in this Motion, including lack of intent to deceive, are reserved
to be raised later if this action survives this Motion.”).
300.
See id. at *41 (“The Hunter case explains why FERC has no
jurisdiction to pursue its claims against Defendants in this case.”).
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CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over commodities futures
contracts.301 Barclays argues that the trades at issue are under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC.302 If the case is dismissed
on this ground, it would be another significant blow to the
breadth of FERC’s jurisdiction.
Second, Barclays argues that “entity” in the antimanipulation statute does not include individuals, and thus,
FERC cannot penalize the individual traders. 303 Barclays argues
that the plain meaning of the term “entity” does not include
natural persons.304 The resolution of this issue will set important
precedent because FERC could not assess penalties against
individual traders if the court determines that individuals are not
covered in the statute. 305
Third, Barclays argues that the complaint does not state a
claim of market manipulation.306 Citing precedent from the
Supreme Court and Circuit Courts of Appeal, Barclays contends
that FERC has not alleged manipulative conduct.307 If the case is
dismissed on this ground, regulated entities will have their first
example of how courts will apply rule 10b-5 precedents to FERC
cases.
An issue that Barclays did not explicitly raise in its brief,
but reserved for the future, is the intent element of

301.
See Hunter, 711 F.3d at 159 (“[I]f a scheme, such as
manipulation, involves buying or selling commodity futures contracts,
CEA section 2(a)(1)(A) vests the CFTC with jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
agencies.”).
302.
See Barclays Brief, supra note 292, 2013 WL 7045799 at *21
(“[T]he CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the alleged manipulative
scheme . . . .”).
303.
See id. at *50 (“The FPA only permits FERC to regulate the
manipulative acts of entities,
such as businesses and organizations.”).
304.
See id. at *22 (“The plain meaning of the term “entity” does not
include natural persons.”).
305.
See id. at *50 (arguing that because FERC’s regulation of
manipulative activities is limited to entities, the claims against Mr. Brin, Mr.
Connelly, Ms. Levine, and Mr. Smith should be dismissed).
306.
See id. at *22 (“[T]he Complaint fails to state a claim and
should be dismissed as a matter of law.”).
307.
See id. at *54 (“There is a complete absence of allegations of
manipulative conduct, as defined by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit,
against any of the Traders.”).
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manipulation.308 In the Barclays case—especially in the context of
the traders’ emails—FERC infers intent from emails or instant
messages.309 Barclays may try to persuade the court or jury that
FERC’s inferences are insufficient to establish manipulative
intent.310 Given FERC’s strong reliance on the traders’ intent,
Barclays may believe that a judge will not see the intent FERC
relies on to prove both the intent and fraud elements. FERC has
already stated that the transactions taken by the traders
themselves could be legal without manipulative intent. 311 Thus, if
Barclays can disprove intent, the case may have to be dismissed.
For example, trader Karen Levine argues that to prove
intent against her, the prima facie case must be assumed.312 The
emails she sent are not overtly manipulative; she did not instruct
anyone to trade uneconomically to protect her financial swaps. 313
In the instant message FERC relies on, Levine offers an alternate
explanation to a question about trading.314 She does not state
which explanation is the correct one.315 Accordingly, it may be
difficult for FERC to convince a court or jury that an alternate
explanation in an instant message and email, asking colleagues
to try trade a certain way, proves intent to manipulate a market.

308.
See id. at n.56 (“[A]ll other objections to the manipulation
claim not raised in this Motion, including lack of intent to deceive, are reserved
to be raised later if this action survives this Motion.”).
309.
See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, Docket No. IN08-8, 144
FERC ¶ 61,041, 15 (July 16, 2013) (stating that because Levine did not include
any mention of uncertainty in the profitability of financial swaps, that she was
sure, and part of the scheme).
310.
See Barclays Brief, supra note 292, 2013 WL 7045799 at n.56
(reserving the right to attack the FERC for “the lack of sufficient allegations of
an intent to deceive.”).
311.
See Order Assessing Civil Penalties, Docket No. IN08-8, 144
FERC ¶ 61,041, 19 (July 16, 2013) (stating that the difference between a legal
trade and an illegal one is intent).
312.
See id. at 28 (“Levine herself contends that the only way the
cited communications could be construed as evincing manipulative intent is if
the existence of the manipulative scheme is already presupposed . . . .”).
313.
See id. at 30–31 (arguing that although Levine did not spell
out in her email why her trading instructions furthered the manipulative
scheme, her emails furthered the scheme anyway).
314.
See id. at 29 (arguing that Levine’s addition of an alternate
reason to trade their shows she had manipulative intent).
315.
See id. at 29 (arguing that Levine was not referencing Barclays
at all in her instant message).
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VII. Factors for Determining Whether to Force FERC into
Federal Court
There are many different factors a regulated entity should
consider before deciding whether to take its case into federal
court.316 These factors include: (1) timing of the entity’s
cooperation; (2) whether the company self-reported; and (3) the
size of a potential fine.317
As an initial matter, it is useful to consider why FERC
agrees to settlements. One reason FERC is willing to reduce fines
is because it believes that settlements are in the interest of public
policy. 318 Settlements allow FERC to sequester ongoing violations
and unjust profits. 319 For example, FERC does not accept
mitigating factors for unjust profits because the harm has
already occurred. 320 A regulated entity should consider whether
there are ongoing violations, and unjust profits derived from such
violations, when assessing how to approach a FERC
investigation.321 If the entity knows that the violations and unjust

316.
See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC
¶ 61,068, 61,243 (October 20, 2005) (“Our purpose is to provide firm but fair
enforcement of our rules and regulations and to place entities subject to our
jurisdiction on notice of the consequences of violating the statutes, orders, rules,
and regulations we enforce.”).
317.
See id. (“In discussing the factors we will take into account in
determining the severity of penalties . . . for violations, we also recognize the
importance of demonstrable compliance and cooperation efforts by utilities,
natural gas companies, and other entities subject to the statutes, orders, rules,
and regulations administered by the Commission.”).
318.
See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶
61,156, 62,013 (May 15, 2008) (“[T]he public interest is often better served
through settlements . . . .”).
319.
See id. (“[W]e are able to ensure that compliance problems are
remedied faster and that disgorged profits may be returned to customers
faster . . . .”).
320.
See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC
¶ 61,068, 61,247 (October 20, 2005) (“[A]t a minimum a company involved in
wrongdoing must disgorge any unjust profits resulting from the wrongdoing.”).
321.
See id. at 61,249 (“The manner in which a company
approaches cooperation will be an important factor in determining whether, and
how much, credit may be given for cooperation.”).
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profits have ceased, it may predict FERC’s sanctions more
easily.322
Another initial question is whether the company selfreported.323 Self-reporting may show that the company has a
strong commitment to compliance.324 This commitment fosters
the belief that the company is trying to comply with FERC
regulations in good faith, which may permit a reduction in
fines.325 However, if the company did not self-report, that will
affect two different factors that FERC uses to assess penalties: (1)
there will be no argument that the entity self-reported, and (2)
the entity will have a difficulty arguing for a strong culture of
compliance if it cannot find its own mistakes.326
Once the Office of Enforcement has determined that a
violation occurred, a company loses one of its incentives to settle
quickly and quietly.327 Because the Commission counts
settlements that occur before trial proceedings as prior
adjudications, regulated entities do not have an incentive to
settle quickly to benefit them in future proceedings.328 The impact
of a settlement on the regulated entity is that its compliance will

322.
See id. (“The factors discussed in this Policy Statement
provide guidance to the industry on the approach we will take to future
enforcement.”).
323.
See id. at 61,247 (“We place great importance on selfreporting. Companies are in the best position to detect and correct violations of
our orders, rules, and regulations . . . and should be proactive in doing so.”).
324.
See May Policy Statement, Docket No. PL08-3, 123 FERC ¶
61,156, 62,019 (May 15, 2008) (“We also place great value on self-reporting,
particularly when it points to a strong compliance program.”).
325.
See id. (“We . . . will maintain our practice of awarding penalty
credit for parties that promptly self-report violations, assuming such conduct is
not negated by a poor compliance culture.”).
326.
See id. (“[S]elf-reporting is no substitute for a strong
compliance program . . . .”).
327.
See September Policy Statement, Docket No. PL10-4, 132
FERC ¶ 61,216, 62,140(Sept. 17, 2010) (“We generally consider that an
organization’s efforts to achieve or maintain compliance with our requirements
should not be the basis for an offset to or reduction in the penalty amount for a
violation because the organization should have been in compliance before the
violation.”).
328.
See id. at 62,141 (“The Commission considers prior settlements
for purposes of considering an organization's prior history and we will continue
to do so under the Penalty Guidelines.”).
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not be as highly regarded in future actions.329 If the regulated
entity committed any violation against FERC or any other agency
in the past ten years, its compliance score will be higher than if it
had no prior adjudications.330 Because of the impact on future
proceedings, a regulated entity should consider settling with
FERC before the proceeding counts as a prior adjudication.331
In their October Policy Statement, FERC states that it
will account for cooperative conduct when assessing penalties. 332
Therefore, a regulated entity should consider whether their fine
reduction from cooperation makes paying the total fine cheaper
than the cost of litigation.333 The September Policy Statement
states that there could be a significant reduction in the penalty
assessed or no penalty at all;334a ninety-five percent reduction is
possible.335 Cooperation is available even if the company did not
self-report.336 However, uncooperative conduct is also taken into
account.337 Additionally, a firm that will receive a small fine may
get it reduced to zero.338
329.
See id. (deciding that prior history will be used on a case-bycase basis and may indicate a lack of commitment to compliance).
330.
See id. at 62,137 (“[A]n organization's culpability score
increases by one point if there was a Commission adjudication of any violation
less than ten years earlier or if there was an adjudication of similar misconduct
by any other enforcement agency.”).
331.
See id. at 62,141 (“The Commission considers prior
settlements for purposes of considering an organization's prior history and we
will continue to do so under the Penalty Guidelines.”).
332.
See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC
¶ 61,068, 61,243 (October 20, 2005) (“[W]e also recognize the importance of
demonstrable compliance and cooperation efforts . . . .”).
333.
See Fetty, supra note 8 (discussing an entity that chose to
litigate against FERC after receiving a $415 million fine).
334.
See September Policy Statement, Docket No. PL10-4, 132
FERC ¶ 61,216, 62,133 (Sept. 17, 2010) (discussing the benefits of compliance
under the penalty guidelines).
335.
See id. (“[A]n effective compliance program could result in a
ninety-five percent reduction in penalties when combined with other factors.”).
336.
See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC
¶ 61,068, 61,248 (October 20, 2005) (“[T]he Commission will consider these
factors even for entities that did not self-report violations, provided that
cooperation was provided once the violation was uncovered.”).
337.
See id. (“Lack of cooperation is a serious matter and will be
weighed in deciding appropriate remedies.”).
338.
See id. (“[P]rompt and full self-reporting of violations, coupled
with steps to correct the adverse impact on customers or third parties from the
misconduct, may result in . . . no civil penalty being assessed.”).
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A final factor to consider is that FERC has authority to file
in the jurisdiction of its choice depending on how broadly a court
is willing to read “the appropriate court” language of Section
31(d)(3)(B).339 The energy markets that Barclays allegedly
manipulated were in California, and FERC may believe that a
favorable judgment is more likely in the affected state.340

VIII. CONCLUSION
The value of the Barclays enforcement proceeding itself is
immense. When decided, it will be the only precedent for
regulated entities to determine how a federal court will
administer the anti-manipulation rule. With FERC rapidly
increasing its number of enforcement actions and the amount of
the fines levied, regulated entities will intently analyze the
outcome of this case.341
Looking at the factors, there are two types of actions that
benefit from immediate cooperation with the agency and two
types of actions that benefit from litigation in federal court.342 A
regulated entity that receives an enormous fine on evidence it
believes is weak, like Barclays, and an entity receiving what it
believes is an entirely unwarranted fine, might take FERC to
court.343 However, regulated entities that believe they can settle
339.
See 16 U.S.C. § 823b (2014) (“[T]he Commission shall institute
an action in the appropriate district court of the United States for an order
affirming the assessment of the civil penalty.”)
340.
See Barclays Brief, supra note 292, 2013 WL 7045799 at *2.
(“[T]his District is convenient and also has a powerful interest in this matter as
it involves Respondents’ manipulation of electricity markets in and around this
District.”).
341.
See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC
¶ 61,068, 61,246 (October 20, 2005) (explaining that FERC wants to develop a
consistent approach to levying penalties in cases of analogous misconduct,
“taking all relevant factors into account.”).
342.
See id. at 61,244 (“The proposed regulations will provide . . .
for imposition of civil penalties. It is therefore important that we articulate how
we intend to apply our new . . . civil penalty authority . . . to assure the industry
that we will temper strong enforcement measures with consideration of . . .
mitigating factors, in determining the appropriate remedies.”).
343.
See 16 U.S.C. § 823b(d)(3)(B) (2014) (demonstrating that
because regulated entities only have 60 days to pay fines, it may be
economically beneficial, in terms of legal fees, to litigate winnable cases against
FERC instead of hastily paying and assuming fault).
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for a small financial penalty and entities that are aware of strong
evidence against them, like JP Morgan, should cooperate to
significantly reduce their penalty.344

344.
See October Policy Statement, Docket No. PL06-01, 113 FERC
¶ 61,068, 61,247 (October 20, 2005) (explaining that compliance and cooperation
may drastically lower an entity’s penalty).

